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COMMENT
SECURITIES FRAUD OVER THE INTERNET: THE FLIES IN THE
OINTMENT AND A HOPE OF FLY PAPER
Kevin Mason*
I. INTRODUC1ION
EVEN THOUGH RELATIVELY FEW Americans have used it,' and even
fewer have used it to purchase anything,2 the Internet appears to be
everywhere nowadays. Every major advertisement on television includes
the sponsor's web-site, and even representatives of such prosaic busi-
nesses as tire-retreaders3 and sellers of 78-rpm records4 have their fingers
in the on-line pie. The future is described as a "cyber-future"; the net as
"the bringer of economic salvation."5 Soon, we are told, goods,6 services,
and even our investments7 will be routinely and cheaply purchased in the
* B.A., University of Iowa; J.D. candidate, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law, 1998.
1 See CLIFFORD STOLL, SILICON SNAKE OIL, 16-17 (1995) (noting that while some
have stated the number of Internet users as very high, this is a "gross exaggeration"
as the actual number is not known, but is probably much lower). But see Alexander
C. Gavis, The Offering and Distribution of Securities in Cyberspace: A Review of
Regulatory and Industry Initiatives, 52 Bus. LAw., 317, 319-20 (Nov. 1996) (describing
the number of PC owners and the expectation of that number growing dramatically).
2 See STOLL, supra note 1, at 106-07. While the traditional London International
Finalcial Futures Exchange is slightly less efficient than its fully automated and on-line
German equivalent, the Deutsche Terminborse, London handles three times as many
trades. Id. at 92-94.
3 See, e.g., <http://www.bandag.com> (visited on Apr. 18, 1998).
4 See, e.g., <http:lwww.cyteen.com> (visited on Apr. 18, 1998).
s See STOLL, supra note 1, at 9-10 (describing and criticizing the National
Infrastructure Initiative Progress Report's glowing predictions of a "reduc[tion] of health
care costs by some $36 billion per year, prepar[ing] our children for the knowledge-
based economy of the 21st century, add[ing] more than $100 billion to our Gross
Domestic Product over the next decade, and add[ing] 500,000 new jobs by 1996").
" See, e.g., Online Marketplace, <http://www.jup.com/newsletter
marketplacelfeature.shtnl> (visited on Apr. 18, 1998) (stating that while the Internet has
generally not lived up to its hype, on-line catalogs may soon eclipse paper-based
catalogs in dollar volume of sales.)
" See Christina K. McGlosson, Comment, Who Needs Wall Street? The Dilemma
of Regulating Securities Trading in Cyberspace, 5 COMMLAW CoNsPECTus 305, 312
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privacy of our homes, via computer network and modem.
One obstacle preventing the effective implementation of this vision
is, as anyone who has posted e-mail messages to a bulletin board knows,
the problem of "junk mail."8 Newsgroups 9 are inundated with messages
advertising unwanted products and services"0 and pyramid schemes are
abundant."
One can buy everything from athletic shirts 2 to cars on-line. That
sooner or later someone would decide to offer securities is a given;
moreover, as the Internet is a cheap and anonymous 3 means of mass
communication, it should also come as no surprise that the Internet
provides a convenient vehicle for securities fraud.
So if the Internet is so packed with dubious offers and get-rich-quick
schemes, why would any honest issuer want to distribute securities on-
line? The fact is, the net offers many obvious advantages (and some less
obvious ones) to the issuer of securities and to secondary markets. The
Internet has the potential to provide an efficient means of marketing
(1997) (quoting Forrester Research as stating that by the year 2001 there will be 9.3
million Internet investment accounts). To some extent this is already becoming a reality,
as many investment firms maintain on-line databases or even take orders on-line. See,
e.g., <http://www.deanwhitter.coni> (visited on Apr. 18, 1998).
' Cf. Gregory C. Yadley, The Challenges of Technology: The Regulators' Response
to Securities Offerings on the Internet, SB69 ALI-ABA 189, 197. Feb. 7, 1997 (quoting
SEC Commissioner M.H. Wallman's statement that investment discussions in electronic
chat rooms may have little effect on market fluctuations). Placing junk mail on the
internet is referred to as having "spammed the net." See STOLL, supra note 1, at 104.
' "Newsgroups" are text-based, Internet discussion groups, similar to computer bul-
letin boards, and contain a series of posting from various users, about a given topic.
Newsgroups are located on a network known as "Usenet" rather than on the Internet.
See also HARLEY HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE INTERE COMPLETE REFERENCE 554-56
(1996). For an example of a newsgroup, see, e.g., rec.audio.tubes.
"o Some examples I have personally encountered include psychic consultation type
services, sales of machine tools, requests for charitable donations, and advertisements
for phone-sex lines.
1 Cf. 1994 NASAA Rep. (CCH) § 8228 (describing a New Jersey prosecution for
running an illegal Internet pyramid scheme).
,2 See <http://www.cnnsi.com/store> (visited on Apr. 18, 1998).
13 See STOLL, supra note 1, at 56-57 (stating it is difficult to learn the identities
of those on the Internet as it is easy to be anonymous and no identification is required
to be on-line). It is even possible to set up a non-existent computer, complete with
accounts, files, and password protection on the Internet. Computer security monitors at
AT&T did this in order to "trap" a hacker. See WILLIAM R. CHESWICK & STEVEN M.
BELLOviN, FIREWALLS AND INTERNET SECulrTY: REPELLING THE WILY HACKER 167-79
(1994).
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investments, especially for smaller issuers, but only if some of the
problems currently endemic in the system can be solved.
Two of the thorniest problems in Internet marketing and distribution
of securities are fraud and the general lack of confidence in on-line
investing.
Part I of this Comment details several legitimate attempts to market
securities on-line. Part I also tackles the question of why the Internet has
the potential to provide a dynamic securities market. Part II examines the
response by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to Internet
attempts at marketing securities and electronic dissemination of disclosure
documents. Part III briefly discusses types of Internet securities fraud and
other problems inherent in the electronic investment marketplace. Part IV
outlines a proposed partial solution to attempts at fraud and how it relates
to and goes beyond such legitimate offerings of securities as discussed in
Part I. Finally, several shortcomings inherent in my proposed solution are
discussed.
II. Two STEPS FORWARD: THE FIRST INTERNET-BASED SEcuRTIES
DIsTRIBUTONS AND CREATION OF THE FIRST INTERNET-BASED
SECONDARY MARKETS
In February of 1996, Spring Street Brewery became the first issuer
to market an Initial Public Offering of securities (IPO) on the Intemet.'4
Spring Street's subsidiary, Wit Capital, became the world's first invest-
ment bank dedicated to securities offerings over the Internet.'5 Spring
Street sold its small initial subscription of $1.6 million in common stock
entirely over the Internet,'6 and more importantly, Spring Street sold its
,4 See Yadley, supra note 8, at 197-98.
,S See: Wit Capital Corporation: Our History <http://www.witcapital.coni/welcome/
home.htnl> (visited on Apr. 18, 1998). See also MCGLOSSON, supra note 7, at 307
(describing the development of on-line securities trading).
"6 See Wit Capital Corporation, supra note 15. However Spring Street's $1.6
million capitalization is small compared to the $3 trillion in domestic pooled funds. See
BErrY KRIKORIAN, FIDUCIARY STANDARDS IN PENSION AND TRUST FUND MANAGEMENT
36 (2d ed. 1994). Additionally, despite the novelty and publicity associated with Spring
Street's position as the first Internet-based IPO, it took Spring Street several months to
completely sell its subscription. See Wit Capital Corporation, supra note 15. Traditional
IPOs, using underwriters, may sell out as quickly as under an hour. This fact suggests
that even with Spring Street's qualified SEC approval, the investing public is not
especially confident in the viability, reliability, or value of the on-line investment.
However, some of Spring Street's difficulties in selling out its subscription may have
stemmed from inaccurate pricing of its IPO. See generally ERNEST BLOCH, INSIDE
INvESmAENT BANKING 223-25 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing the wildly inaccurate price of
Morgan Stanley's 1986 IPO).
19981
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securities without the use of, and consequently without paying any
commission to, underwriters.'7 An investor with Internet access merely
had to download Spring Street's prospectus,'" complete the forms includ-
ed in the prospectus, and e-mail the forms back to Spring Street.'
Spring Street provided a secondary market for its securities via a web-
based bulletin-board called Wit-Trade.'
Wit Capital has since formed a subsidiary, Wit Brokerage, and has
registered Wit Brokerage as a broker-dealer,2' all with the intention of
profiting from a much-hoped-for boom in Internet-based securities market-
ing and issuing.' Wit-Trade voluntarily shut down soon after commence-
ment of operations, following a request by the SEC.' After discussion
and some changes, Wit-Trade was allowed to resume business a few days
later.24
" See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(11) (Law. Co-op. 1983) (An underwriter is "any
person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct
or indirect participation in any such undertaking . . ."). See also William J. Grant, Jr.,
Overview of the Underwriting Process, in SECURITES UNDERwRITING 25, 28 (K.
Bialkin & W. Grant eds., 1985) (explaining that underwriters' fees can range between
one and thirteen percent of the value of an IPO).
" Delivery of a prospectus at or before confirmation of sale of a security is
required for all such sales of securities, unless some exemption exists. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(e) (law. Co-op. 1983). A prospectus is defined as "any . . . notice, circular,
advertisement, letter or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers
any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(10)
(Law. Co-op. 1983).
," Wit Capital News and Development: World's First Digital IPO
<http://www.witcapital.com>. (visited on Apr. 18, 1998).
o See id.
21 See Wit Capital Corporation, supra note 15. See also Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(4 and 5) (Law. Co-op. 1983) (defining "broker" as
"any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the ac-
count of others . . . ." and defining a "dealer" as "any person engaged in the business
of buying and selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise
See generally Paul Gerard Johnson, The Virtual Fiduciary: The Internet and Its
Effects On Fiduciaries. 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 431, 439-40 (1997) (discussing the
potential boom in securities marketing and issuing through the Internet); McGlosson,
supra note 7, at 307 (describing Wit Capital's early entry into the on-line securities
trading market).
' See Staff Clears Way for N.Y. Concern to Resume Stock Trading on Internet, 28
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 437 (1996) [hereinafter Staff Clears Way].
2" See id. Wit-Trade's founder, Andrew Klein, a former securities attorney, praised
the SEC's willingness to work with his company and with Internet-based trading sys-
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The next tentative step towards the development of a full-fledged
Internet-based investment market came in June of 1996, when a company
calling itself Real Goods Trading Corporation set up an electronic bulletin
board to facilitate the sale of its stock. Real Goods is traded on an
exchange, but the stock price and stock offerings of Real Goods have
suffered from the effects of poor liquidity.' To alleviate this problem,
Real Goods set up a bulletin board which displayed the names and
addresses of prospective buyers and sellers of Real Goods' stock.' The
system did not itself execute trades. Rather, prospective buyers and sellers
were to simply read the bulletin board and then contact each other if they
were interested in trading Real Goods' stock.'
Before beginning "trading" activity, Real Goods requested the SEC
to allow it to maintain the bulletin board without the prohibitive time and
expense of registering all potential purchases and sales as "offers" and
"sales" under the 1933 Securities Act. Similarly, Real Goods wanted to
avoid becoming a "dealer,"'  "broker,"29 or "exchange"3 under the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, or an "investment adviser" under the 1940
Investment Advisers Act." Significantly, the three SEC divisions respon-
sible for enforcing the statutes mentioned above agreed not to recommend
enforcement actions "if RGTC operate[d] the system in the manner
described in [its] letter."32
In July, 1996, the SEC granted a no-action letter to IPONet, a Texas
company engaged in the placement of public, as opposed to private,
tems. See id.
' See Real Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action Letter [1996-1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 77,226 at 77,131 (June 24, 1996).
2 Id.
27 Id. at 77,132.
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1983) (defining a "dealer" as "any
person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account,
through a broker or otherwise . . .").
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. 1983) (defining "broker" as "any
person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others . . ").
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1983) (defining "exchange" as "any
organization, association, or group of persons ...which constitutes, maintains, or
provides a market place ...for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities
or for otherwise performing the functions commonly performed by a stock ex-
change . . .").
", See Recent Agency Action, Securities Law-SEC Allows Internet-Based Trading of
Securities, 110 HARv. L. RV. 959 (1997).
" See Real Goods Trading Corp., supra note 25, at 77,134 (June 24, 1996); Recent
Agency Action, supra note 31, at 360.
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offerings of securities on the Internet." The letter contained a variety of
restrictions, chief of which is that the Internet broker-dealer is responsible
for any omissions or misstatements on their Internet site 4 IPONet is
protected by a password, which grants access only to those deemed "so-
phisticated investors. 35 Wit Capital is also running a "digital exchange"
for the benefit of account holders."'
Advantages of the evolving Internet distribution systems are obvious.
For instance, Internet-based securities distribution systems are both cheap
and fast. No underwriter is involved,37 saving the investor and the is-
suer" money. No printing costs39 are involved in setting up a web-site
or Internet prospectus; the issuer simply must pay to have the site profes-
sionally "set up," and no major expenses are incurred thereafter. No
matter how many times the site is accessed, the cost is the same to the
' See IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,252 at 77,271 (July 23, 1996) [hereinafter IPONET, SEC No-Action
Letter].
3 See id.
- Id. at 77,272 and 72,274 (determination as to which potential investors are
"sophisticated" investors in the sense of the 1933 Act is performed by an electronic
interactive question and answer series). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215(e),(f) (1997) (An
"accredited investor" is defined by the 1933 Act Rules as "any natural person whose
individual net worth or joint net worth with the person's spouse, at the time of his
purchase, exceeds $1,000,000 . . . . Any natural person who had an individual income
in excess of $200,000 in each of the last two most recent years or joint income with
that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year").
See Wit Capital Corp., supra note 15.
The value of an underwriter's services lies in the underwriter's ability to
accurately set a price for an IPO, and in the ability to quickly and efficiently market
the IPO. See generally BLOCH, supra note 16, at 248-73 (describing the process used
to set the price for securities). The use of the Internet eliminates the issuers need to
rely on an underwriter to market the security.
38 The securities provided have the same intrinsic value as securities marketed in
the traditional manner, but are not sold subject to an underwriter's discount or a
dealer's re-allowance. Cf. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECuRrrIs UNDERWRrNG
294 (1983). "Intrinsic value" here is defined as the discounted present value of the
securities' future return streams, minus any risk. Underwriting as such does not increase
the value of this return stream. The issuer must pay the underwriters' commissions out
of the proceeds of the distribution, the issuer must set the total value of the distri-
bution such that it can raise needed capital and pay the underwriters. Id.
'9 See Grant, supra note 17, at 31-32 (describing the costs associated with printing
stock certificates). Not only are financial printers themselves expensive, but delays in
printing can be costly, as such delays mean that highly paid professional staff are
waiting for forms to arrive, with the staff's professional fees piling up. Id.
SECURITIES FRAUD OVER THE INTERNET
issuer.
Not only does using the Internet to trade and distribute securities
save money, when the Internet is used to effect prospectus delivery, there
is no turnaround time between the sending of a prospectus to potential
purchasers and the purchaser's receiving the prospectus; e-mail and
downloading are nearly instantaneous. Furthermore, it is a quick and
simple matter to send a prospectus to a potential buyer of a security
before the final confirmation of sale.4' The potential investor then has
the opportunity to review the contents of the final prospectus before the
sale is consummated, which is rarely the case under the present system.4
This system potentially provides the investor with even greater protection
than exists under the conventional system. In many cases, no preliminary
prospectus or selling materials are used in the conventional distribution of
securities, so the investor only receives a final prospectus at the confirma-
tion of sale.42 Providing the investor with a prospectus beforehand allows
the investor to more carefully decide if whether to purchase that particular
security.
A less obvious advantage of electronic marketing and distribution of
securities is that these techniques also provide the small business issuer
with increased liquidity and a wider market for capital. The Internet pro-
vides a potentially nation-wide43 or even a world-wide market for raising
capital, where, for example, a little-known microbrewery in New York
can solicit funds from anywhere in America." The Internet is accessible
- See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (Law. Co-op. 1983) (section 5 of the 1933 Securities Act
requires a prospectus to be delivered at or before the delivery of a registered security).
All sales of securities by issuers or underwriters, and all sales by dealers before a
certain time after registration, are required to be registered with the SEC. See 15
U.S.C. § 77(e)(c). See also 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (listing exceptions to the requirements
of § 77(e)(c)).
41 See Thomas Gilroy & Kenneth G. Fall, Due Diligence and 10-K Disclosure
Enhancement, in PREPARATION OF ANNUAL DIsCLOsuRE DOcUMENTS 1997 at 391, 480
(PLI Corp. Law & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 969)(stating that the final
prospectus is required to be sent only after confirmation of the rule).
Id. (stating that where no preliminary prospectus or other selling materials are
distributed the buyer may only receive the final prospectus).
' This, however, ignores the effect of state securities laws, or "blue sky" laws. See
discussion infra Part EI.
' Wit Capital claims that this allows small investors to directly purchase shares in
IPOs and that this was previously a privilege of large institutional investors. See Wit
Capital Corp., supra note 15. As will be discussed in Part m, infra, while it is true
that large institutional investors are chosen as underwriters for IPOs, and that it can be
profitable for smaller investors to participate in these offerings, problems of risk and
valuation of the investment make participation by less sophisticated investors a risky
1998]
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from almost anywhere, allowing investors trading in small stocks a wider
potential market in which to trade, thereby enhancing the liquidity of
small or little-known companies or funds.45 By allowing investors to
trade directly with the electronic market, the costs and commissions
associated with trades effected through a broker-dealer are eliminated.'
Ell. THE SEC RESPONSE TO THESE FIRST STEPS: TENTATIVE
APPROVAL
While the SEC has not discouraged the use of the Internet as a
means for the distribution of securities,47 it has evinced some concern
about "creating a monster," that is allowing activity to go unregulated that
may have unforeseen and disastrous consequences. To that end, the SEC
has scrutinized the three offerings previously discussed above, and has
made suggestions or, in some cases, required changes in the structure of
each of them. As noted, Spring Street/Wit Trade voluntarily complied
with the SEC's request to shut down soon after commencing opera-
tions.' Spring Street was forbidden to accept money directly from inves-
tors; payments were made to a third-party escrow account.49 More im-
portantly, Spring Street agreed to provide investors with continuing
disclosure about any risks associated with trading in its securities and to
disclose the fact that Spring Street securities are not traded on any regular
exchange and therefore, Spring Street's shares may be illiquid.50 Ad-
ditionally, because Wit Trade customers could appear to be holding
themselves out as "dealers" if they posted "buy" and "sell" orders at the
same time, Spring Street was required to warn its posters of this risk.5
Spring Street was required to maintain a "transaction history" for
venture.
This fact is not without its disadvantages. See discussion infra Part l.
However broker-dealers do serve a useful function. There are disadvantages to a
"brokerless" system. See discussion supra Part I.
4 In fact, it might be argued that the SEC relaxed some of its registration
requirements in the case of Real Goods Trading Corporation. See Real Goods Trading
Corp., supra note 25, at 77,131; Recent Agency Action, supra note 31, at 960-61. See
also Staff Clears Way, supra note 23, at 437 (stating that Wit Capital's founder
concluded that the SEC showed remarkable willingness to work with him).
4 See Staff Clears Way, supra note 23, at 437.
See <http://witcapital.com> (visited on Apr. 28, 1998). Spring Street is not an
SEC-registered broker-dealer, therefore Spring Street was required to relinquish control
over its funds to an independent agent.
5o See id.
5' See 5 COMMLAW CONsPECTus 305, 308. Such trades are known as two-sided;
see also McGlosson, supra note 7, at 309 (describing the requirements the SEC placed
on Spring Street).
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customers, where the price and number of shares recently traded were to
be disclosed. 2 Records had to be maintained of "all securities transac-
tions effected through the system and [to] make them available on request
to the SEC. '53
Real Goods Trading Corporation's bulletin board was also prohibited
from advertising "two-sided" trades," and the information the bulletin
board could furnish about potential investors was limited.55 IPONet
investors cannot participate in offerings made before they became IPONet
customers.
Electronic delivery of disclosure documents from issuers to investors
is also permitted under certain circumstances.' The SEC press releases
illustrate a variety of scenarios under which electronic dissemination of
disclosure documents is permitted or forbidden, but the rules they outline
fall into four categories.58 The investor must have notice, that is, be
aware that the data has been sent or can be read on the Web. The
issuer must know that the investor is in fact able to access the electroni-
cally transmitted data.' The investor must be able to request and receive
a "hard copy" from the issuer, and the issuer must have some sort of
proof of delivery to the investor."'
While the SEC should be applauded for its open-mindedness in
allowing these experiments with Intemet-based trading to go forward in
the first place, there are three recurring pitfalls inherent in the SEC's
approach. First, despite the standards set out in SEC releases and no-
action letters, these standards do not serve to directly increase investor
confidence in legitimate Internet-based securities offerings. The second
problem is that the SEC standards make buying securities over the
Internet unduly inconvenient for most investors. Finally, the savings
realized by "printing" disclosure documents on-line rather than on paper
52 Id.
53 Id. at n.56.
' See Yadley, supra note 8, at 198.
55 Id.
5' See also Stephen G.Martin, The Convergence of Securities Law and the Internet,
71 FLA. BJ. 46, 47 (Jan. 1997) (describing IPOnet and the no-action letter they
received from the SEC in July, 1996).
' See IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 33, at 77,274; Interpretation,
Solicitation of Comment Release No. 33-7233, A Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3200 at
3128 (Oct. 6, 1995) [hereinafter SEC Release 33-7233].
58 See id., at 240.
5' See id.
See id.
" See id.
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are only largely realized by an issuer willing to limit his capital market
to those investors who will not request paper copies of disclosure docu-
ments.
IV. ONE STEP BACK: THE (SOMETImIES) LESS OBVIOUS
DISADVANTAGES OF ON-LINE CAPITAL FORMATION
The most obvious problem with marketing securities in cyberspace
is that of fraud. In fact, the SEC 2 and several states63 have already
begun prosecuting several cases of securities fraud over the Internet."
While there are many different types of securities fraud, some attributes
of the Internet make it ideal, not only for such profitable but un-
imaginative frauds as the sale of shares in some non-existent eel ranch,'
but for more sophisticated types of manipulations.
The Internet is a relatively anonymous means of communication.'
E-mail addresses can be changed quickly and easily. There is no neces-
sary connection between a place and an e-mail address. A user can "log
on" from anywhere and immediately send or receive e-mail. A user can
also easily create several different e-mail addresses, each with its accom-
panying persona.67 "Market manipulation" on a large scale, therefore,
becomes easy on a electronic bulletin board where securities are traded.
One possible method is for the manipulator to disparage the securities
62 See, e.g., SEC v. Pleasure Time, Inc. et al., S.E.C. Litigation Release No. 14825,
Feb. 26, 1996. (Internet used to sell $3 million dollars in unregistered securities. In-
vestors were to purchase interests in a "worldwide phone lottery"); SEC v. Frye, S.E.C.
Litigation Release 15139, 95 Civ. 9205 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1996) ("defendant falsely
represented facts regarding a Costa Rican investment for which he solicited funds over
the Internet").
' See Yadley, supra note 8, at 195 (describing an America OnLine user's sale of
$50,000 in fraudulent securities).
' My sources list 16 cases of securities fraud prosecuted by state or Federal
authorities.
It is important to note, however, that the increasing power and decreasing price
of the personal computer make such frauds more and more feasible. It is fairly easy
to set up a professional-looking web-site, and selling efforts can be amplified by the
increasingly common and increasingly potent audio-video capabilities of many comput-
ers. The world-wide extent of the web, coupled with the automatic nature of the
computer make it possible to reach (and defraud) would-be investors far more ef-
ficiently than is possible through, say, the telemarketing of fraudulent securities.
' See Yadley, supra note 8, at 197 (describing fears of prosecutions based upon
mistaken identity).
67 This is made much easier by the fact that most e-mail providers do not verify
the real addresses and identities of their subscribers. Cf. Yadley, supra note 8, at 198
(noting the security measures required by the SEC).
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traded on the board, either by publishing negative but misleading data or
by posting "sell" orders at a very low price, under false names, and then
purchase the securities at an undervalued price." A manipulator may
also purchase securities, tout their merits under a different name, and sell
them at an inflated price. 9
The attraction of these two schemes is that the manipulator does not
have to post such false or misleading statements on the same bulletin
board or exchange as the securities are traded on.70 Any commonly
accessed service will do. A cruder variation on the above scheme is to
blackmail a financially weak issuer with the threat of publishing false or
misleading information to be posted on a bulletin board not controlled by
the issuer!'
Still another problem, related to Internet security as much as to
fraud, is the problem of "hacking." Hackers may either disrupt trading
in Internet-based securities, or may simply electronically transfer the
virtual securities or cash payments to their own accounts. 3 Either result
does not bode well for investor confidence, and may even result in a
lawsuit against the issuer/bulletin board provider for failure to maintain
adequate security.
Another technique which creates a potential for liability on the part
of the bulletin board provider is where a con artist uses the names and
addresses of posters on an investment-related bulletin board (such as Wit-
Trade) as a "prospect list" of persons to fleece with a fraudulent offer of
unregistered securities. While the fraudulent securities need not be offered
"on-line," the electronic bulletin board does provide a ready list of
's See Basic. Inc. v. Levinson, 485 US 224 (1988)(endorsing a "fraud on the
market' theory).
S'The real-time nature of the Intemet, combined with its growing base of users,
makes it a prime target for stock touting and bashing." NASD Notice to Members 96-
50, <http:llwww.nasdr.comI2611/26119650.htm> (visited on Apr. 28, 1998).
70 While the same technique may be used in theory for "off-line" securities trading,
I doubt it would be as effective. Many traditional investors never read electronic
bulletin boards, and may be skeptical of "virtual news" in general, if they or the mar-
kets ever hear about it. On the other hand, Internet investors are likely to be much
more aware of Internet news and therefore they, and the market in which they trade,
are more susceptible to such electronic manipulations.
"' See Yadley, supra note 8, at 197 (explaining that while it is more difficult to
identify the manipulator behind fraudulent email messages, such manipulators cannot
successfully raise freedom of expression as a sustainable defense).
' "Hackers" are persons who intrude on a secured computer or system. See
CHEsWICK & BELLOviN, supra note 13, at xiii (1994). "Hacking" is the act of intrusion
itself. See id.
" For an overview of the problems of network security, see generally id. at 3-17.
4991998]
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
persons already favorably disposed to investments over the Internet.
Enforcement of securities laws relating to fraud is especially difficult
if the users sell from off-shore and use the Internet as an inexpensive
means to communicate with and thereby defraud U.S. investors.
Violations of securities law can be completely accidental. While it
has been mentioned that including "links" from an issuer's web-site to
other web-sites may make the issuer liable for any fraudulent activity on
those other web-sites,74 the most daunting problem for the small Internet
issuer is the problem of state securities regulations, or "blue sky" laws.
To avoid state-law liability for securities fraud, an securities issue
and its issuer must comport with the blue sky laws of every state in
which it is offered.' These laws are not necessarily coextensive with
federal securities registration laws or each other.76 This is an especially
thorny problem because of the near-global reach of the Internet; by
putting a distribution of securities on-line, the securities may in effect be
"offered" in every state.' Registering the securities in all fifty states7
is prohibitively expensive for small issuers, especially in cases where the
issuer does not expect to sell many securities in Montana, but still must
register there to avoid criminal or civil fraud charges. 9 In short, the
reach of the Internet itself gives rise to liability.
States have been slow to respond to the concept of Internet market-
ing of securities.' Pennsylvania is typical of the states which have
recognized this method of distribution.8' Issuers need not register their
7" See SEC Release 32-7233, supra note 57, at 3131-36 (describing a hypertext link
to a research report covering an Interet-based security as being akin to sending a final
prospectus). This is illegal if the effective date of the security has not passed. See 15
U.S.C. § 77(e) (Law Co-op 1983).
7' Cf. Ronald L. Loeb & David J. Richter, Electronic Offerings: Securities Law in
the Age of Internet, in ADvANCED SEcuRrrms LAW WORKSHOP 1996, at 319, 325 (PLI
Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook No. 953) [hereinafter Loeb & Richter].
76 See WniLAm L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CoRPoRAIoNs 1528 (7th ed, 1988).
' In addition, some states require that any "dealers (including issuers, brokers, and
salesmen)" in securities register in that state. See id.
78 "[Al states have blue sky laws in effect." See id.
79 See generally CARY & EiSENBERG, supra note 76, at 1527-29 (discussing blue
sky laws or state securities regulation statutes). In addition, "40 states ... require
escrow arrangements [for promotional shares]." James F. Mofsky, BLUE SKY RESTRIc-
TIONS IN NEW BuSINESS PROMOTIONS 35 (1971).
' Cf. Loeb & Richter, supra note 75, at 325 (noting however that states have not
relinquished jurisdiction over Internet-based offerings of securities).
"' See Blue Sky Rep. (CCH) 48,684 (Sept. 1, 1995) (This was originally con-
ceived as a one-year administrative order, beginning January 1, 1995. The order has
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Internet-based securities in Pennsylvania, as long as their distribution
materials contain a disclaimer clearly stating that the securities offered are
not for sale in Pennsylvania or to Pennsylvania residents.' Perhaps this
slow pace of development is not surprising, given the relatively low
number of legitimate Internet-based IPOs compared to the number of
fraudulent IPOs.
On-line issues of securities can even run into problems without
violating any laws. The first problem is one of plain and simple in-
formation overload.83 In a world where every sort of investment informa-
tion imaginable is now available on the Internet," it becomes almost
impossible for the less sophisticated investor to sort out the useful infor-
mation from the irrelevant, and consequently, to make rational and
informed investment choices.
Plans as noble-sounding as Wit Capital's dream of making small IPO
more accessible to ordinary investors can also be disastrous. In a world
where the valuation of an IPO is not an exact science,' collides with
the world where investors lose fortunes in Internet eel-ranch interests,
there is bound to be trouble.
V. AND Now FOR A POSSIBLE SoLU ON ....
One recurring theme found throughout this discussion on Internet
securities trading is both how a virtual marketplace resembles and, in
some respects, differs from the physical one. In a similar vein while the
concept of Internet-based trading has its attractions, the solution to many
been extended until September 1, 1997.). Some exceptions exist. For example, Texas
allows general solicitations of unregistered securities to "accredited investors." See, e.g.,
7 TEX. ADMiN. CODE § 139.16 (West Supp. 1997) (State Securities Board). A Califor-
nia limited offering exemption to qualified purchasers also permits general solicitation.
See Cal. Corp. Code § 25102(n) (West Supp. 1998) (providing for the specific
requirements for such a general solicitation).
' See Blue Sky Rep. (CCH) § 48,684 (Sept. 1, 1995) (discussing an exemption
request by a Pennsylvania corporation).
' See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Corporate Finance In The Information Age, 11 INSiGHTS
19 (Mar. 1997) (SEC Chairman Levitt describes the problem facing investors as "[t]oo
much information" and states that "MIore disclosure does not always mean better
disclosure").
" See Johnson, supra note 22, at 434-35 (outlining the "unlimited investment
information" available through the Internet).
' See generally BLOCH, supra note 16, at 248-73 (discussing the underwriting
process).
' This fraud suggests that the problem of finding investors confident enough to buy
securities over the Internet should be redefined as the problem of finding intelligent
investors confident enough to buy legitimate securities over the Internet.
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of the problems identified above resembles a common physical solution,
one that relies on markets rather than government intervention, that is, the
creation of one or more organized Internet Stock Exchanges, possibly
similar to the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quo-
tations (NASDAQ),' but available to the general public, as well as to
securities brokers and dealers.88
Such Exchanges could eliminate or alleviate the various problems
associated with Internet securities fraud in the same way that the New
York Stock Exchange prevents the most egregious frauds from reaching
the Big Board; by maintaining strict standards of conduct and enforcing
them. The exchanges would serve as gatekeepers.89 By keeping shady
investments out, a hypothetical exchange could simultaneously provide a
"seal of approval" for the "honest" securities sold in these exchanges.' °
By providing a fair market for non-fraudulent securities, they would
increase the liquidity of their securities on a secondary market. A de-
served reputation for fairness would increase the amount of money spent
in these exchanges and would further promote the securities traded within,
at the expense of "non-publicly traded" Internet-based securities.9'
The exchange would necessarily require some verification that
participants are in fact, "real" persons, with known addresses.' A well-
See Loss, supra note 38, at 675, n.47.
While NASDAQ has no physical market floor, existing only on computer termi-
nals, NASDAQ is technically an intranet, or a system whose access is restricted to
members and whose terminals are not accessible by computers not "hard-wired" to the
intranet. The solution I am describing is part of the internet, where any computer
linked to the World Wide Web can access the market.
' Underwriters perform much of the "gatekeeping" role in traditional offers of
securities; the underwriter's duty of due diligence requires them to ensure that all the
issuers financial statements and disclosures are materially correct. See Thomas Gilroy
& Kenneth G. Full, Due Diligence and 10-K Disclosure Enhancement, 969 PLI/CORP
391, 401-410 (Jan.-Feb. 1997).
' In the same way physical-world bonds are rated by firms such as Standard and
Poor's, it may become possible to meaningfully rate the prospects of Internet invest-
ments using a similar system.
" While the existence of organized physical securities markets has not eliminated
the Over The Counter market for securities, whether for better or worse, it probably
has reduced the size of the Over The Counter market, if for no reason other than the
higher liquidity of securities traded on exchanges.
In addition, it may be that given the Internet's reputation for containing many du-
bious investments, a selection of relatively safe investments, such as those brokered by
the exchanges I am describing, will through competition erode the Internet equivalent
of Over The Counter securities.
' Without such verification, an electronic trader could trade in Interet-based securi-
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organized exchange could alleviate the problems associated with "hack-
ing"; the exchange could control electronic "points of access" to its
databases and "trading floor" and hire professional "detectives" to monitor
electronic "break-in" attempts.
A formally organized exchange can work closely with the SEC to
ensure compliance with all laws, rules, and regulations, and cooperate
with the SEC in policing market manipulation. Obviously, the exchange
would have to register as a "broker," "dealer," "exchange," and possibly
"investment advisor." In addition, the exchange would be required to join
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD.)' The exchange
can keep files of all prospectuses of companies traded in its market and
provide them to investors as needed. Such an arrangement would also
benefit the SEC because if the "net grows as rapidly predicted, there is
almost no way for the SEC to monitor it without outside help." 4
If the virtual exchange is eventually defined by the SEC as a
"national exchange" within the meaning of section 18 (the recently enact-
ed National Securities Markets Improvement Act or NSMIA) of the 1933
Act, most of the thorny requirements posed by state securities regulation
are eliminated.95 "Covered" securities are exempt from state registration
and other blue sky law requirements.' Among the classes of "covered
securities" are securities traded on a national exchange.9 A national
exchange is one that has the Commission determines has listing standards
substantially similar to the NYSE, NASDAQ, etc.98 States retain jurisdic-
tion under NSMIA to prosecute fraud, but it is apparent that "fraud" does
not mean the simple lack of state registration.'
ties, and if he or she lost money, could never be tracked down for payment.
' See Loss, supra note 88, at 699-798 (discussing the requirements for becoming
an exchange).
I See YADLEY, supra note 8. The day after the first draft of this Comment was
submitted for publication, I received an e-mail touting yet another hot deal on a stock
with unlimited potential for growth and profits. When I forwarded this communication
to the SEC's enforcement division at sec.enforcement.gov., I received a courteous form
letter in response, stating in effect that my request for enforcement was appreciated. A
few days later, I sent another e-mail to the above SEC e-mail address, detailing some
questions I had in regard to this Comment. I received an identical e-mail in reply.
" See generally Ronald J. Coffey, Reform Follows Function: Efficient Federalism,
available on-line at <http:/Iawwww.cwru.edulcwrulaw/faculty/coffey/coffey.html> (visited
on Apr. 28, 1998), at V, VI (1997) (discussing federal preemption of state securities
laws).
9 See 15 U.S.C. 77(r)(1)(ab) (Law. Co-op. 1983).
See 15 U.S.C. § 77(r) (Law. Co-op. 1983).
See id.
9 See Coffey, supra note 95.
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While a national exchange does not paint the freewheeling picture
envisioned by Wit Capital's founder,"° most of the savings associated
with trading securities over the Internet, instead of on a traditional trading
floor, are retained. Securities could still marketed directly by the issuers,
could still reach just as large a market (because the exchange is open to
all participants), and can be run twenty-four hours a day.' Small com-
panies can still use the exchange as a means to raise venture capital, and
the exchange can still be reached from almost anywhere."° Costs associ-
ated with financial printing are still largely eliminated.
The exchange would probably be financed by a fee, assessed as a
percentage of dollar value of trades executed. However, the increased
liquidity of shares traded on the exchange would likely be worth more to
investors than the fees paid to take advantage of this liquidity."°3 Trans-
action costs of trading on an Internet-based exchange would potentially
still be lower than those associated with a traditional marketplace. Two
tiers of brokers, those associated with the seller of securities and those
associated with the buyer, would be eliminated under this scheme. An
Internet exchange should be the exclusive market for trading in shares of
member companies." 4 Otherwise investors might "free ride" off the
services and enhanced value provided by such an Internet-based exchange.
However, it might also be argued that the New York Stock Exchange
does not face a serious competitive threat from investors who read the
financial papers and then sell shares of NYSE-listed companies over the
counter."°
An Internet-based exchange as outlined here does not solve all the
problems associated with Internet trading. The "bedside manner" associat-
ed with the traditional broker-dealer would be missing. The American
investing public would not be fully protected from off-shore issuers who
undertake distributions on the web, whether or not they showed any
fraudulent intent. As in a pure Over The Counter Internet market, accord-
" See supra notes 15-19.
10. But see STOLL, supra note 1, at 93-94 (discussing some of the disadvantages of
running on-line trading facilities 24 hours a day).
" If anything, such an exchange will be even more accessible than an unassociated
number of private issuers scattered about the web, because there will be one, better-
known net location rather than many unrelated locations.
03 This may help avoid problems with antitrust liability, which are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
" Ordinarily there is nothing to prevent a security from being listed on more than
one exchange. See Loss, supra note 38, at 668.
oS In addition, such activity, if conducted regularly, would be illegal according to
the provisions of the '33 Act, and '34 Act. See discussion supra Part I.
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ing to current SEC regulations, a "net-based exchange will have to
content itself with only dealing with investors who do not wish to be
mailed paper copies of disclosure documents." A centrally located cyber-
exchange may also be more susceptible to hardware failures or system
crashes. 6 Some reliable means of continuously backing up the system
will have to be devised. Otherwise a hacker might be able to purchase
securities and, if unable to sell them for a quick profit, "crash" the
exchange before the record of purchase is backed up and thereby erase all
records of the purchase.
An equally serious problem is how to provide start-up capital for a
new exchange without a large number of issues to trade or volume of
trade and without imposing excessive transaction costs. Another problem
involves valuation. An important duty of the underwriter in the traditional
securities offering is the measured appraisal of the value of an issuer's
stock.
However, if these problems (and any others not foreseen) are solved,
the Internet may provide an efficient and inexpensive means to trade a
greater volume of securities with less cost than ever before, while allow-
ing small businesses to access less expensive start-up capital and reach a
greater number of potential purchasers.
"1 Even mighty NASDAQ is not invulnerable to hardware problems. Squirrel
damage to transmission lines has brought the NASDAQ system to a halt on several oc-
casions. The emergency transmission systems failed to work as advertised. See STOL,
supra note 1, at 99.
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